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Algorithms Implemented in Space and Time 
Paul Schweizer
1
 
Abstract. A fundamental question regarding computation 
viewed as a physical phenomenon concerns the criteria under 
which a physical system can properly be said to implement an 
abstract formal procedure. I advocate the Simple Mapping 
Account (SMA) and defend this position against a number of 
critiques, including semantic and causal accounts. In line with 
SMA I support the conclusion that realizing or implementing an 
abstract computational procedure is not an intrinsic property of 
physical systems, but rather is based on a purely observer-
dependent act of ascription. This 'anti-realist' conclusion has 
traditionally been invoked in an attempt to undermine the 
Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), which in turn has led 
supporters of CTM to criticize SMA and propose competing 
accounts. In contrast, I argue that the version of CTM directly 
threatened by SMA is one that should not be accepted in any 
case, and propose an alternative strategy for those who would 
defend CTM against charges of 'triviality'.        1the  
1     INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental question regarding computation viewed as a 
physical phenomenon concerns the criteria under which a 
physical system can properly be said to implement an abstract 
formal procedure. A very straightforward and elegant account 
articulated by Putnam [1] is based on a simple mapping between 
formalism and physical structure. Accordingly, a physical 
system P performs a computation C just in case there is a 
mapping from the physical states of P to the abstract 
computational states of C, such that the transitions between 
physical states reflect the abstract state transitions as specified by 
the mapping. The minimalism and elegance of the Simple 
Mapping Account (SMA) make it the natural choice as the in-
principle standard for physical implementation − it takes the 
Mathematical Theory of Computation (MTC) as its starting point 
and adds no substantive assumptions.  
 Central to MTC is the intuitive notion of an effective 
or ‘mechanical’ procedure, which is simply a finite set of 
instructions for syntactic manipulations that can be followed by a 
machine, or by a human being who is capable of carrying out 
only very elementary operations on symbols. A key constraint is 
that the machine or the human can follow the rules without 
knowing what the symbols mean. The notion of an effective 
procedure is obviously quite general – it doesn’t specify what 
form the instructions should take, what the manipulated symbols 
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should look like, nor precisely what manipulations are involved. 
The underlying restriction is simply that they are finitary and can 
proceed ‘mindlessly’ i.e. without any additional interpretation or 
understanding. So there are any number of different possible 
frameworks for filling in the details and making the notion 
rigorous and precise. Turing’s ‘automatic computing machines’ 
[2] (TMs), supply a very intuitive and elegant rendition of the 
notion of an effective procedure, and in the ensuing discussion 
TMs will be taken as the conceptual archetype. But there is a 
variety of well known alternative frameworks, including 
Church’s Lambda Calculus, Gödel’s Recursive Function Theory, 
Lambek’s Infinite Abacus Machines, etc. 
Turing machines and other types of computational 
formalisms are mathematical abstractions and don’t exist in real 
time or space. In order to perform actual computations, an 
abstract Turing machine must be realized by a suitable 
arrangement of matter and energy, and as Turing observed long 
ago [3], there is no privileged or unique way to do this. Like 
other abstract structures, Turing machines are multiply realizable 
- what unites different types of physical implementation of the 
same abstract TM is nothing that they have in common as 
physical systems, but rather a structural isomorphism expressed 
in terms of a higher level of description. Hence it’s possible to 
implement the very same computational formalism using modern 
electronic circuitry, a human being executing the instructions by 
hand with paper and pencil, a Victorian system of gears and 
levers, as well as more atypical arrangements of matter and 
energy including beer cans serving as tokens of the symbol ‘1’ 
and rolls of toilet paper serving as the tape. 
Adopting notational conventions introduced in  
Schweizer [4], let us call this ‘downward’ multiple realizability, 
wherein, for any given abstract structure or formal procedure, 
this same abstract structure can be implemented via an arbitrarily 
large number of distinct physical systems. And let us denote this 
type of downward multiple realizability as ‘↓MR’. After the 
essential foundations of MTC were laid, the vital issue then 
became one of engineering – how best to utilize state of the art 
technology to construct rapid and powerful physical 
implementations of our abstract mathematical blueprints, and 
hence perform actual high speed computations automatically. 
This is a clear and deliberate ↓MR endeavour, involving the 
intentional construction of artefacts, painstakingly designed to 
follow the algorithms that we have created. From this top-down 
perspective, there is an obvious and pragmatically indispensible 
sense in which the hardware that we have designed and built can 
be said to perform genuine computations in physical space-time.    
 
2     COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF MIND   
 
According to the widely embraced computational theory of mind 
(CTM), which underpins cognitive science, Strong AI and 
various allied positions in the philosophy of mind, computation 
(of one sort or another) is held to provide the scientific key to 
explaining and, in principle, reproducing mentality artificially. 
The paradigm maintains that cognitive processes are essentially 
computational processes, and hence that intelligence in the 
natural world arises when a material system implements the 
appropriate kind of computational formalism. Various critics of 
CTM have put forward a family of 'trivialization arguments', 
stemming directly from the SMA. The arguments are based on 
the contention that the notion of a physical system implementing 
a computational formalism is overly liberal to the point of 
vacuity, since a mapping will obtain between any sufficiently 
complex physical system and virtually any computational 
formalism. This would appear to trivialize CTM, since whatever 
computational formalism is held to account for our cognitive 
attributes will also be realized by a myriad of other ‘deviant’ 
arrangements of matter and energy, from buckets of water to 
microwave ovens to possibly even stones. By CTM it would 
seem to follow that such obviously insentient systems have the 
same cognitive attributes that we do, since they can be 
interpreted as implementing exactly the same computations. For 
example, assuming SMA, Putnam offers a proof of the thesis 
that every open physical system can be interpreted as the 
realization of every finite state automaton. In a closely related 
vein, Searle [5] argues that virtually any physical system can be 
interpreted as following virtually any program. Thus hurricanes, 
our digestive system, the motion of the planets, even an 
apparently inert lecture stand, all possess a level of description at 
which they instantiate any number of different abstract formal 
procedures. The stomach has inputs, internal processing states 
and outputs, and if one wanted to, one could interpret the inputs 
and outputs as code for any number of different symbolic 
processes. And in [6] Searle attempts to illustrate the extreme 
conceptual looseness of the notion of implementing an abstract 
formalism by claiming that the molecules in his wall could be 
interpreted as running the WordStar program. 
 In this manner, critics of CTM utilize SMA to argue 
for 'multiple realization' in the form of a one-to-many-relation 
between physical structure and abstract interpretation. Again, 
adopting notational conventions introduced in Schweizer, let us 
label multiple realizability in this direction, wherein any given 
physical system can be interpreted as implementing an arbitrarily 
large number of different computational formalisms ‘upward 
MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR’. The basic import of ↑MR is the 
non-uniqueness of computational ascriptions to particular 
physical systems. In the extreme versions suggested by Putnam, 
Searle, and more recently Bishop [7], there are apparently no 
significant constraints whatever – it is possible in principle to 
interpret every open physical system as realizing every 
computational procedure. Let us call this extreme version 
‘universal upward MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR*’. Mere ↑MR is 
weaker than ↑MR*, since the former does not assert that there 
are no salient constraints, and hence ↑MR would be consistent 
with the denial that, e.g., the molecules in Searle’s wall can in 
fact be interpreted as implementing the WordStar program, 
although every physical system is still interpretable as 
implementing some very large set of distinct computations. 
 In the present discussion I will not argue for or against 
↑MR* but restrict consideration to the more modest ↑MR. In 
view of ↑MR, it’s still never the case that any given 
computational interpretation of a physical system is privileged or 
unique, and this is far more difficult to deny than the powerful 
and broad sweeping ↑MR*. In turn, the non-intrinsic status of 
computation would seem to follow as a direct consequence of 
mere ↑MR alone. As long as there are at least two distinct 
interpretations, there is no objective fact of the matter regarding 
which computation is ‘actually’ being performed, nor which of 
the alternatives is the ‘correct’ or ‘real’ account. And this is 
because the computation itself is not an intrinsic property of the 
physical device, and is instead dependent on a human observer to 
supply the various alternative interpretations. 
 This is not to say that it’s purely a matter of caprice, 
and that there are no objective constraints that the interpretation 
must satisfy. Instead, the situation is perhaps comparable to the 
distinction between natural kinds, such as water, and 
conventional kinds, such as being a table. Even though 
membership in either kind might be based on criteria whose 
satisfaction (or not) is a matter of objective truth, still the criteria 
for conventional kinds are not intrinsic, and there is nothing 
about the particular arrangement of matter now holding up my 
desk top computer which makes it intrinsically a table. The 
salient criteria stem purely from human practices and 
stipulations rather than from, e.g., fundamental microstructure or 
natural law. 
 
3    THE SEMANTIC ACCOUNT 
 
Advocates of CTM typically attempt to defend their paradigm 
against such trivialization arguments by rejecting SMA as itself 
overly liberal, and advocating additional constraints on the 
notion of ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ implementations, to distinguish 
them from the many presumably ‘false’ cases countenanced by 
SMA. In this manner, the hope is that the myriad of apparent 
counterexamples generated by SMA will be screened off as 
‘fakes’, and the cogency of CTM thereby preserved. Three 
primary categories of constraint put forward by defenders of 
CTM include the semantic account (SA), the causal account and 
the counterfactual account. Each of these will be explored and 
critiqued in turn, beginning with the first. 
 Concerning the semantic account of computation, the 
‘received view’ in the philosophy of mind is that computation 
must involve representational content. This view is encapsulated 
in Fodor's [8] famous edict that there is "no computation without 
representation". According to SA, computation is stipulated to be 
the processing of representations, and only physical states that 
are ‘representational’ can serve as implementations of the 
computational states in question. However, I will presently argue 
that this move is infelicitous for a number of reasons, and later in 
the paper will propose an alternative strategy for those who 
would defend CTM against trivialization. The SA is infelicitous 
because: 
 (1) It advocates a departure from MTC, whereas MTC 
is the canonical source of our conceptual grasp of computation. 
As above, classical computation is defined as rule governed 
symbol manipulation, and a key proviso is that the rules can be 
followed without any knowledge of what the ‘symbols’ are 
supposed to mean. As Piccinini [9] aptly observes, 
representational content plays no role whatever in MTC. 
 (2) MTC is clear and rigorous, while the further 
restrictive notion of ‘representation/reference’ invoked by SA is 
imprecise and problematic. Hence this is a retrograde step from 
clarity and generality to narrowness and potential obscurity. 
Indeed, given the notorious difficulties in providing a 
satisfactory rendition of ‘representation’ in objective scientific 
terms, SA is in the rather ironic position of promulgating a 
restriction on the global notion of computation in the physical 
world that is itself unlikely to be successfully naturalized. 
 (3) Our computational artefacts are the paradigmatic 
instances of physical computation and can yield any number of 
counterexamples to SA. A Turing machine designed to compute 
the values of a particular truth function, say inclusive 
disjunction, can be easily reinterpreted as computing 
conjunction instead, simply by flipping the intended reference of 
the symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’. There is no independent fact of the 
matter regarding what these syntactic tokens ‘really represent’ − 
their referential value is entirely dependent upon an arbitrary 
scheme of interpretation. As a consequence, there is no unique 
meaning determined by the formal procedure as such, and a 
multitude of distinct and incompatible interpretations are always 
possible. This highlights a fundamental flaw related to (1) above: 
computation is essentially pure syntax manipulation, and how the 
syntax is interpreted is an additional feature not intrinsic to 
computation per se. SA stipulates that this extrinsic feature is 
essential, even though the discipline of Computer Science makes 
no such claim. I would argue that SA commits the mistake of 
conflating ‘computation’ simpliciter with ‘syntax manipulation 
under an intended interpretation’. But of course, the formal 
syntax manipulation can take place in the absence of any 
interpretation.  Hence in a very clear, rigorous and universal 
sense, contra Fodor there is computation without representation, 
because semantics is purely extrinsic to effective procedures as 
such. 
 (4) The primary reason for making the foregoing 
conflation and attempting to tether the notion of computation to 
some story about representation does not stem from any issues 
concerning the general theory of computation itself, but rather is 
driven by a particular stance within a specialized explanatory 
project in the philosophy of mind. And this is an overly parochial 
source for deriving restrictions on physical computation in 
general. 
 In response to these infelicities, I would contend that 
SA is not a viable approach to computation per se. So rather than 
adopt this limiting and undermotivated standpoint, we should 
instead take MTC, one of the towering intellectual achievements 
of 20th century theorizing, as the canonical framework for 
understanding computation in the general abstract sense, and we 
should adopt SMA as the global, theory-neutral template for the 
concomitant notion of physical implementation. These two 
standards are utterly rigorous, comprehensive and impartial, and 
are not themselves in any need of tweaks or alterations. As noted 
above, the main reason for the restrictions imposed by SA stems 
not from the general nature of computation, but instead serve to 
protect vested theoretical interests held by other disciplines that 
assume computation as a primary ingredient in their specialized 
explanatory frameworks.  In section 7. I will return to the issue 
of CTM and propose an alternate strategy for those who would 
defend the paradigm against charges of empirical vacuity.  
4     CAUSAL CONSTAINTS 
In response to ↑MR* and the associated trivialization arguments, 
a number of other authors including Chrisley [10], Chalmers 
[11], Copeland [12], and Block [13] propose further constraints 
on computational interpretations. Two of the most intuitively 
compelling restrictions are supplied by (i) causal and (ii) 
counterfactual considerations. Although both (i) and (ii) are 
plausible and natural suggestions, I will argue that neither are 
ultimately unsuccessful in blocking ↑MR*. 
 Regarding point (i), Chalmers, for example, contends 
that it is a necessary condition (for counting as a legitimate 
implementation) that the pattern of abstract state transitions 
constituting a particular run of the computational procedure on a 
particular input, must map to an appropriate transition of 
physical states of the machine, where the relation between 
succeeding states in this sequence is governed by proper causal 
regularities. This suggestion constitutes quite a natural and 
immediate corrective measure in response to the extreme laxity 
that might seem to underwrite ↑MR*, since the physical states in 
the chronological progression exploited by Putnam's method 
have no nomological connection.  
 Nevertheless, I would argue that the constraint is too 
strong in general and rules out cases which should not be 
excluded. There are many instances of sequences of physical 
states that we count as realizing a particular computation simply 
because, according to our abstract blueprint,  the correct series 
of physical sate transitions actually occurs. For example, 
standard computers rely on a hierarchy of levels of description 
pertaining to 'virtual machines', and it is entirely natural to 
construe high level virtual machines as genuinely implementing 
computations, even though the states at this level of description 
are not themselves causally connected. Furthermore, we do not 
need to know anything about the complex underlying 
architecture nor its causal underpinning in the electromechanical 
hardware, in order to ascertain that the respective computation is 
successfully being carried out. All we need to take into account 
is what actually happens at the given level of virtual machine 
description.  
 In an analogous manner, consider the following 
sequence of Turing Machine tape configurations, where each 
digit corresponds to the contents of one square of the tape, and 
the underlined digit to the currently scanned square: 
                  Begin   110100 
                 110100 
  110100 
  110100 
  110100 
  110100 
  110000 
  110000 
  111000 
  111000 
  111000    Halt 
This sequence is the implementation of a particular program for 
addition positive integers in monadic notation, and constitutes a 
computation of 2+1=3. Yet the entries in this sequence bear no 
decipherable causal relations to each other, and now that the 
sequence is completed it can be revisited at any future date and 
still confirmed as a computation of 2+1=3, even though there is 
no longer any causal or even temporal connection between the 
already finished entries in the sequence of digits constituting the 
implementation. 
 Similarly, in various situations where a human being is 
following an abstract computational procedure, the transition 
from one state to the next is not causal in any straightforward 
physical or mechanical sense. When I take a machine table set of 
instructions specifying a particular TM and then perform a given 
computation with pencil and paper by sketching the 
configuration of the tape at each step in the computation, the 
transitions sketched on the piece of paper are not themselves 
causally connected: one sketch in the sequence in no way causes 
the next. It is only through my understanding and intentional 
choice to execute the procedure that the next state appears on the 
paper. Clear-cut physical causation of the sort required by 
Chalmers comes in only very indirectly, as in light rays 
illuminating the page and allowing me to see the symbols, and at 
an elementary and extraneous level, as in the friction between 
the pencil lead and the paper’s surface causing various marks to 
appear.  
 Yet this is a perfectly legitimate and indeed 
paradigmatic case of implementing a Turing machine. And 
likewise in the Chinese room, it is merely through Searle’s 
understanding of English, his voluntary choice to behave in a 
certain manner, and a number of highly disjointed physical 
processes (finding bits of paper in a certain location, turning the 
pages in the instruction manual, all mediated by the human 
agent) that the implementation takes place. Searle, as an 
intentional agent, is choosing to cause various things to happen 
in accordance with a set of rules that he chooses to follow. And 
Searle's intentionally characterized behaviour is not something 
that we currently have any hope of ever being able to recast in 
terms of causal regularities at the purely physical level of 
description.  
 One might rejoin that, at least in principle, it's still 
theoretically possible to characterize the overall system purely in 
terms of natural laws and causal regularities, a la Dennett's [14]  
Martian superscientist, who doesn't require the intentional stance 
to predict human behavior. And while this may well be true in 
principle, I don't think it really helps, since we can't do so, and 
we're the ones interpreting Searle as performing a computation. 
One could perhaps simply assert that, since Searle is indeed 
performing a computation, then there must be the appropriate 
sort of causal regularities underpinning his behavior, even 
though we don't know what they are and can't foresee a time in 
the future when we will. But why must there be such 
regularities? ‒ presumably because Searle is performing a 
computation and the causal account is true... But such a line of 
reasoning would clearly beg the question. Undoubtedly Searle's 
behavior must have a cause, but from this it does not follow that 
it is governed by any physically characterizable regularities that 
even remotely resemble the structure of the algorithm.  
 Furthermore, we can let chance and randomness into 
the scenario. Suppose at each step in the computation Searle flips 
a coin, and will only follow the rule if the coin comes up heads. 
And suppose further that, for a particular run on an input 
question, the coin comes up heads every time and Searle 
successfully outputs the answer. He has still implemented the 
formalism, even though this outcome was not predictable on the 
basis of causal regularities or natural law.  
 And how could we know that the right causal 
connections are preserved via Searle's agency, even in the cases 
where he sincerely intends to follow the rule book? ‒ how do we 
know that at some crucial stage he did not misunderstand the 
rules, and the step he actually intended to perform would have 
been a mistake, but that by a slip of attention he did not perform 
the step he intended but rather accidentally performed the correct 
one? As long as the step was correct we should count this as a 
physical realization of the abstract procedure. And indeed, how 
do we know that such self cancelling pairs of mistakes don't 
sometimes occur in our computational artefacts?  
 In such cases, the physical sequences count as 
implementations simply because what can be interpreted as the 
appropriate states in the procedure occur in the correct linear 
order. In other words, the intended mapping, a la SMA, has been 
preserved. And this highlights a very key point ‒ the 
fundamental criterion is normative rather than causal. 
Underlying causal considerations are the wrong level of analysis, 
partly because there is then no sense in which error or 
malfunction can occur. Physical processes 'obey' natural law-like 
regularities in a purely descriptive manner, and over the time 
evolution of a physical system the trajectory of states in the 
process may or may not correspond to our projected 
computational interpretation. If not, then there has been a 
'malfunction' in the hardware. But of course, systems governed 
by causal regularities cannot malfunction as such, and it is only 
at a higher and non-intrinsic level of description that 
'breakdowns' can take place. We characterize these phenomena 
as hardware malfunctions, not because underlying scientific laws 
have been broken, but rather because the intended interpretation, 
which is prescriptive and non-intrinsic in nature, has. And there 
is always a non-zero probability of error for any algorithms 
executed in physical space-time.  Files become 'corrupted', signal 
transmissions convey 'misinformation', overheating induces 
processing 'faults', etc.   
 All these mechanically mundane occurrences take 
place in complete accord with the causal regularities that govern 
the evolution of physical systems through time. Hence their 
status as 'malfunctions' has nothing to do with causal 
considerations,  and they can be interpreted as such only relative 
to our projected formal mapping. In such cases, the physical 
system fails to count as an implementation on the purely 
normative grounds that the correct sequence of states did not 
occur, and so our intended mapping is violated. To be sure, there 
will be an underlying causal story for  why the hardware 
performed the way it did, but this has nothing to do with the 
question of whether or not the device has successfully 
implemented the algorithm in question. Likewise, there will be a 
causal story for why the hardware performed the way it did when 
our projected interpretation is respected and the physical device 
counts as a 'valid' implementation. In both cases the issue of 
success or failure is determined relative to our intended 
interpretation, and hence is settled on purely normative rather 
than causal grounds. And this is in perfect agreement with SMA. 
 Questions regarding the mechanics of how the correct 
sequence of states happen to occur are not relevant to answering 
the question of whether or not the procedure has been physically 
implemented. In the Chinese Room we can know that the 
procedure has been implemented without knowing how Searle 
himself (or his brain) manages to do the requisite internal 
processing and control his limbs in order to make the correct 
marks on the slips of paper. The physical how is a different 
question, and is not on the same level of analysis as that invoked 
when determining whether or not the desired computation has 
been performed. But this then critically loosens the requirements 
for counting a physical system as instantiating a program. As 
long as what can be described or interpreted as the correct 
sequence of states actually occurs, then the underlying 
mechanics of how this takes place are not strictly relevant. 
 The right sort of causal connections and regularities 
are needed if the instantiation in question is to be fully 
automatic, and if we want to be able to rely on the automatic 
device to perform systematically correct computations yielding 
outputs with the potential to supply us with new information. 
And although this is the engineering norm when constructing 
and interpreting computational artefacts, it does not exhaust the 
general space of possibilities. The causal requirements advocated 
by Chalmers constitute (at best) a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition – in the general case we must still allow for chance 
and human agency to play a role, as well as chronological 
sequences of states that are not themselves governed by 
overarching causal regularities.  
5     COUNTERFACTUAL CONSTAINTS 
In line with (ii) above, Chalmers’ proposed counterfactual 
requirement is aimed at another apparently ‘slack’ feature 
incorporated by Putnam and the SMA, viz. the mapping from 
formalism to physical system is defined for only a single run, 
and says nothing about what would have happened if a different 
input had been given. And it is objected that this is too weak to 
satisfy the more rigorous operational notion of being a ‘genuine’ 
realization. However, in response to Chalmers' (again quite 
natural) proposal, it is worth noting that for a physical system to 
realize a rich computational formalism with proper input and 
output capacities, such as an abstract TM, this will always be a 
matter of mere approximation. For example, any given physical 
device will have a finite upper bound on the size of input strings 
it is able to process, its storage capacities will likewise be 
severely limited, and so will its actual running time. In principle 
there are computations that formal TMs can perform which, even 
given the fastest and most powerful physical devices we could 
imagine, would take longer than the lifespan of our galaxy to 
execute. Hence even the fastest and most powerful physical 
devices we could envision will still fail to support all the salient 
counterfactuals. 
 It will never be possible to construct a complete 
physical realization of an abstract TM – the extent to which the 
concrete device can execute the full range of state transitions of 
which the abstract machine is capable will always be a matter of 
degree. For example, consider the sequence of configurations 
exhibited in section 4, which constitute an implementation of a 
particular TM program for addition of positive integers 
expressed in monadic notation. The extremely simple program 
can be specified in terms of the following set of six quadruples  
           q11Bq1; q1BRq2; q21Rq2; q2B1q3; q31Lq3; q3BRq4 
where the first element in each quadruple (e.g. q1 in the first 
quadruple) is the current state, the second element is the 
currently scanned symbol (either 1 or B for blank, i.e. 0) the 
third element is the overt action (move R or L one square, or 
print a 1 or a B), and  the last element is the covert ‘act’ of 
entering the next state. The exhibited sequence of configurations 
depicts the behavior of the machine given 2 and 1 as inputs, and 
it's a simple matter to implement this particular computation in 
space and time. However, there is no finite upper bound on the 
size of input strings that this abstract machine can deal with. The 
set of six quadruples yields a mathematically well defined and 
effective procedure for adding two strings, each of which 
contains in excess of, say, 10100000000000000000000 1's. And although 
it may be a simple matter to construct an implementation of the 
machine capable of carrying out computations on small input 
numbers, it's not physically possible for any such 
implementation to carry out the computation for the 
astronomical inputs above. Hence no physical implementation of 
this simple four state TM can deal with the full range of possible  
inputs.  
 So, in general, the class of counterfactual cases on 
alternative inputs with which a physical realization can cope is 
by necessity limited – not all counterfactual cases will be 
supported by any physical device implementing any TM. And 
this renders the appeal to counterfactuals inescapably ad hoc. 
The restrictive strategy demands that the mapping be able to 
support counterfactual sequences of transitions on inputs not 
actually given - but precisely how many inputs not actually 
given? One, two, twenty million? For any implementation, there 
will be a finite upper bound on the size of input string it can 
process, and beyond that size there will be infinitely many 
potential inputs for it will not be able to perform the salient 
computation. 
 This indicates that there is no clear or principled cut 
off point demarking ‘genuine’ implementations from ‘false’ ones 
in terms of counterfactuals. As another, more common place, 
illustration of the ad hoc nature of the appeal to counterfactuals, 
consider a standard pocket calculator that can intake numbers up 
to, say, 6 digits in decimal notion. Is this a ‘false’ realization of 
the corresponding algorithm for addition, since it can’t calculate 
106 + 106? It’s an approximate instantiation which is nonetheless 
exceedingly useful for everyday sums. It will always be a matter 
of degree how many counterfactuals can be supported, where a 
single run on one input is the minimal case. Where in principle 
can the line be drawn after that? It’s a matter of our purposes and 
goals as interpreters and epistemic agents, and is not an objective 
question about the ‘true’ nature of the physical device as an 
implementation. In some cases we might only be interested in 
the answer for a single input, a single run. 
 Hence for a physical device to successfully ‘perform a 
computation’ is distinct from ‘fully instantiating a computational 
formalism’. Performing a computation is an occurrent series of 
events, an actual sequence of physical state transitions yielding 
an output value in accord with the normative requirements of the 
mapping from abstract formalism to physical process. And this 
can be satisfied in the case of computing the value of a single 
output on a given input. In contrast, instantiating a complete 
computational formalism is a much more stringent and 
hypothetical notion, requiring appeal to counterfactuals, and as 
above, this will only ever obtain as a matter of degree. In light of 
this distinction, it is clearly possible for a physical device to 
successfully perform a computation without instantiating a 
complete computational formalism, which distinction in turn 
fatally undermines the theoretical force of counterfactuals in 
attempting to determine whether a physical process has 'really' 
performed a computation. 
 In this section I've argued that the question of whether 
a given physical process or device implements a computational 
formalism does not have a proper yes/no answer, and even in the 
most clear cut and paradigmatic case of a custom designed 
artefact, the implementation is a finitely bounded approximation 
which must fall far short of the abstract ideal. And the problem 
of error noted in the preceding section can also be seen to lend 
strong support to the claim that there is no realist true/false 
answer. Even in the case of a custom designed artefact executing 
a single run on one input, there is always a non-zero probability 
of error, which indicates that the physical device is merely a 
concrete 'estimate' of the abstract mathematical blueprint, and 
satisfies the normative procedures only as a matter of degree. 
The artefact may actually compute the correct value in the given 
case, but suppose we then start considering the counterfactual 
class of alternative inputs, and on one of these possible 
alternative runs it would have made an error and outputted an 
incorrect value. Surely this very genuine counterfactual 
possibility does not undermine the actual case, and support the 
claim that the machine does not 'really' implement the intended 
algorithm. But then neither does tactic (ii) successfully rule out 
↑MR* (nor weaker but extremely wide ranging versions of 
↑MR). 
 Furthermore, Bishop has importantly extended the 
SMA strategy to show that any predetermined finite set of 
counterfactuals can be accommodated on this approach. From 
this I would conclude that the underlying and more general 
constraint of concern to those who would delimit the range of 
physical implementation is neither causal nor counterfactual. 
Instead, the point to emphasize is that in ↑MR* exercises of this 
sort, the mapping is entirely ex post facto. The abstract 
procedural ‘trajectory’ is already known and used as the basis for 
interpreting various state transitions in the open system and 
hence characterizing it as an implementation. As long as this ex 
post facto tactic is allowed, then even finite sets of 
counterfactuals can be included. And as emphasized above, our 
actual computational artefacts are themselves only capable of 
handling finite sets of counterfactuals. Hence the pivotal issue is 
not counterfactuals but rather the ex post facto character of the 
mapping. I will return to this theme in a subsequent section of 
the paper. 
6     SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, PHYSICS 
At the abstract, formal level, computation is an essentially 
syntactic phenomenon, and how we choose to interpret 
arrangements of matter and energy as constituting, say, tokens of 
an abstract syntactic type, and thus specifying an implementation 
of the basic computational vocabulary, is entirely independent of 
physical composition. For example, in the downward ↓MR 
direction there is a more or less limitless diversity in the ways in 
which material patterns and arrangements can be viewed as 
implementing the binary notation of ‘0’ and ‘1’, from ink marks 
on a piece of paper, stones placed in wooden boxes, patterns on 
old-fashioned punch cards, electric voltages, beer cans 
positioned on rolls of toilet paper, … And this applies in the 
reverse ↑MR direction as well, wherein the same stones placed 
in wooden boxes can be interpreted as implementing any number 
of distinct computational formalisms.  
Classical computation is rule-governed syntax 
manipulation, and it is no more intrinsic to physical 
configurations than is syntax itself. It is also worth observing 
that discrete states are themselves idealizations, since the 
physical processes that we interpret as performing computations 
are in fact continuous, and we must abstract away from the 
continuity of the underlying substrate and impose a scheme of 
conventional demarcations to attain discrete values. Hence even 
this elemental building block of digital procedures must be 
projected on to the natural order from the beginning. The 
irresistible conclusion to be drawn is that there is a fundamental 
gap separating ‘concrete’ physical reality from the human-based 
ascriptions of abstract syntactic features. 
 In turn, there is yet another fundamental gap 
separating abstract syntactic features from their semantic 
interpretation. Just as syntax is not intrinsic to physics, so too 
semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. Just as being an instance of 
the spoken English sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ is not an 
inherent property of the sound waves constituting any particular 
utterance token, so too, the associated proposition comprising 
the interpretation of the utterance is not intrinsic to the abstract 
syntactic structure. Instead, the associated meaning is determined 
via arbitrary human convention, and the same syntactic item 
could just as well have had the interpretation currently expressed 
in English by ‘The rat is on the table’ or ‘The dog is on the 
hearth’.  
In the context of classical computation, as above, one 
of the key constraints in the notion of an effective procedure is 
that the rules can be followed 'mindlessly', i.e. without knowing 
what the manipulated symbols are supposed to mean.  As a 
consequence, there is no unique meaning determined by the 
procedure as such, and a multitude of distinct and incompatible 
interpretations are always possible. In the simple example given 
previously, a Turing machine ‘intended’ to compute the values 
of a particular truth function, say inclusive disjunction, can be 
easily reinterpreted as computing conjunction instead, simply by 
flipping our interpretation of the symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’. And the 
same procedure interpreted as computing conjunction could 
instead be construed as computing the values of the arithmetical 
function of multiplication restricted to the numerical inputs 0 and 
1. Yet no causal nor counterfactual features of the device have 
been altered by these reinterpretations, which indicates that 
neither of these factors is sufficient to ground claims concerning 
the purported ‘realist’ or non-observer-dependent status of 
computation in the physical world.      
Similarly, formal systems in general are such that the 
transformations on symbols are not specified with reference to 
their intended interpretation. Many classical negative results in 
mathematical logic stem from this separability between formal 
syntax and meaning. The various upward and downward 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that formal systems cannot 
capture intended meaning with respect to infinite cardinalities. 
As another eminent example, Gödel’s incompleteness results 
involve taking a formal system designed to be ‘about’ the natural 
numbers, and systematically reinterpreting it in terms of its own 
syntax and proof structure. As a consequence of this 
‘unintended’ interpretation, Gödel is able to prove that 
arithmetical truth, an exemplary semantical notion, cannot, in 
principle, be captured by finitary proof-theoretic means. 
In summary, there are two fundamental gaps 
separating formal procedures, standardly interpreted as 
computing the values of given functions, from the physical 
processes that we construe as implementing such procedures. 
First there is the gulf dividing the intended semantic 
interpretation from the bare syntactic formalism, and second 
there is the chasm between abstract syntactic formalism and 
physical reality. In both cases the gaps can only be bridged by an 
act of purely conventional human interpretation. And it is in this 
sense that computation in the physical world is inherently 
observer dependent.    
 
 
7   COMPUTATION AND PRAGMATICS  
 
I would now like to propose a different perspective on the issue. 
Rather than distinguishing ‘true’ from ‘false’ cases of 
implementation, what these and other proposed  constraints do 
instead is to go some distance in distinguishing interesting, 
conceptually rich and pragmatically useful implementations 
from the many uninteresting, trivial and useless cases that 
abound in the space of possibility. It’s certainly true that there is 
no pragmatic value in most interpretive exercises compatible 
with ↑MR and ↑MR*. Ascribing computational activity to 
physical systems is useful to us only insofar as it supplies 
informative outputs, which in most cases will come down to new 
information acquired as a result of the implemented calculation.  
 So, interesting and useful observer dependent 
computation takes place when we can directly read-off 
something that follows from the implemented formalism, but 
which we didn’t already know in advance and explicitly 
incorporate into the mapping from the start. That’s the incredible 
value of our computational artefacts, and it’s the only practical 
motivation for playing the interpretation game in the first place.  
Hence a crucial difference between our computational artefacts 
and the attributions of formal structure to naturally occurring 
open systems, as employed by ↑MR* exercises, is that the 
mapping in the latter case is entirely ex post facto and thus 
supplies us with no epistemic gains. The abstract procedural 
‘trajectory’ is already known and used as the basis for 
interpreting various state transitions in the open system and 
hence characterizing it as an implementation. In sharp contrast, 
we can use the intended interpretation of our artefacts both to 
predict their future behaviour, as well as discover previously 
unknown output values automatically.  
 And this is obviously why an engineered correlation 
obtains between fine-grained causal structure and abstract formal 
structure in the case of our artefacts – we want them to be 
informative and reliable! We also want them to be highly 
versatile, and this is where counterfactual considerations come to 
the fore in practice: over time we can do runs on a huge number 
of different inputs, and in principle the future outputs follow as 
direct consequences of the intended interpretation.  So a physical 
system is useful to us as a computer only when its salient states 
are distinguishable by us with our measuring devices, and when 
we can put the system into a selected initial state to compute the 
output of our chosen algorithm on a very wide range of specific 
input values. 
 These pragmatic considerations supply clear and well 
motivated criteria for differentiating useful from useless cases of 
physical implementation. And I would advocate this type of 
pragmatic taxonomy in lieu of attempts to give overarching 
theoretical constraints purporting to distinguish ‘true’ from 
‘false’ cases. Some basic desiderata for pragmatically valuable 
implementations include (a) fully automatic, (b) reliable, (c) 
versatile in the sense of computing values for a wide range of 
different inputs (d) non ex post facto (e) yielding increased 
predictive power with regard to future physical states of  the 
implementing mechanisms, (f) possessing technologically 
manipulable initial configurations and output configurations 
detectable by our measuring devices and (g) physical rather than 
purely abstract constraints on the input and output 
characterizations. 
   
 
8     CTM REVISITED 
 
The last desideratum above supplies a relevant link to one of the 
opening themes of the paper, viz., defending CTM against SMA-
based charges of empirical vacuity. When it comes to physical as 
opposed to purely abstract computation, we often want to place 
physical constraints on the characterization of inputs and 
outputs. In other words, the abstract inputs and outputs are given 
canonical physical interpretations. So the device must be such 
that it has certain types of causal powers to allow it to behave in 
the desired manner. For example, a stone or a bucket of water 
will never be able to pass the Turing test (TT), because the 
system lacks the appropriate causal powers. In order to pass, the 
computational device must produce English sentences as output, 
and Searle's wall can't do this. It may output some thermal 
energy that we could further interpret as code for the appropriate 
English sentence, but then we as observers are performing an 
extra step of interpretation which should not be required. And 
this 'test' could not be interactive like the TT unless the mapping 
from Searle's wall to the computational procedure were not ex 
post facto (if it were, then we would have to settle for canned 
'exchanges' or sample dialogues computed after the fact). At 
least in the CRA, the set-up has the ability to interactively 
process the relevant physically specified input patterns and 
produce output in recognizable/readable Chinese syntax. 
 Hence I would advance a purely formal account of 
computation itself, as well as the SMA version of physical 
implementation, but still disagree with the view that MTC alone 
is sufficient to provide a full computational theory of particular 
subject disciplines, such as a computational theory of vision, or a 
computational theory of the mind. These are particular 
applications of MTC, and will require additional resources 
appropriate to the phenomena and subject areas in question. In 
this respect SMA is not in conflict with more relaxed (and 
empirically plausible) versions of CTM. What SMA directly 
threatens, and what has served as the traditional fulcrum in the 
dialectic, is the Computational Sufficiency Thesis (CST), which 
maintains that merely implementing a computational formalism 
of the appropriate sort constitutes a sufficient condition for 
mentality in the physical world. 
 It is salient to note that from a normal scientific 
perspective, CST is curious indeed. There are many different 
levels of description and explanation in the natural world, from 
quarks all the way to quasars. But there is no comparable 
sufficiency thesis in chemistry, biology, geology, astronomy. In 
other 'special sciences', membership in the corresponding level 
of description is a matter of degree and scientific utility, not a 
matter of some uniformly applicable sufficient condition, an 
essential or intrinsic property. 'Being a rock' is in no way an 
intrinsic property of the conglomerations of particles categorized 
as such, and this level of description is not captured by any 
simple sufficiency thesis. In turn, I would diagnose much of the 
controversy over CTM, the trivialization arguments, and 
concomitant defensive critiques of SMA to be engendered by ill 
advised allegiance to CST. The CTM camp places far too great a 
theoretical burden on computation alone. How could the mere 
fact of implementing the 'right' type of abstract procedure be 
enough to magically transform an insentient arrangement of 
matter and energy into a genuine cognitive system?  
 In contrast, I would argue that much more is required 
− the system must be anchored in and interact with the real 
world in a host of rich and multifaceted ways not satisfied by a 
mere stone or a bucket of water. In terms of a computationally 
based science of mind, a number of pragmatic and application-
specific considerations should come to the fore, to critically 
augment the bare and global framework provided by MTC and 
SMA. Ideally, when treating the highly complex physical 
organism as implementing some abstract computational 
procedure, the ascribed formal structure should supply the high 
level organizational key for the underlying causal structure 
enabling the system to behave in the ways that it does, i.e. in the 
ways salient to its status as a cognitive system. Concomitantly, 
ascribed computational structure would then provide the high 
level (and empirically testable) key for predicting its future 
behaviour.  
 So, even if we were to grant (purely for the sake of 
argument and illustration) that the brain can be interpreted as 
implementing something like Fodor’s [15] Language of Thought 
(LOT), still, this would not be an intrinsic property of the brain 
as a biochemical mechanism. Obviously, there would be no 
scientific interest in a mere ad hoc mapping from LOT onto the 
brain, although in principle this may be possible, a la ↓MR*. 
Instead, for a theoretically substantive approach, there would be 
a myriad of pre-existing and empirically intransigent ‘wet-ware’ 
constraints that the mapping would have to satisfy, in order to 
respect the salient causal structure of brain activity as discovered 
by neuroscience. The largely independent body of functional and 
anatomical data from neuroscience would supply a host of highly 
non-trivial restrictions on how the physical system itself is 
characterized and what the material state transitions should look 
like that are interpreted as implementations of the abstract 
computational procedures. A scientifically significant mapping is 
not free to view the arrangement of matter and energy 
comprising the human brain in terms of brain-irrelevant aspects 
such as cosmic ray bombardment, gravitational fields, arbitrary 
molecular kinetics, etc. Instead, it must restrict itself to salient 
causal factors pertaining to the physical system's time-evolution 
when viewed as a brain. So a version of Chalmers' causal 
regularities between states would in fact obtain in this more 
regimented and specialized case, because, like a standard 
computational artefact, the brain must perform the implemented 
computational procedures automatically and reliably.  
 If a physical system when viewed as a brain were 
methodically interpretable as implementing the LOT, this would 
entail that the transitions between the various neurological states 
instantiating respective tokens of mentalese symbols, obeyed a 
causal progression in accord with the transformation of these 
symbols as prescribed by the abstract computational formalism. 
If this could be done, it would provide a scientifically fruitful 
and explanatorily powerful key to organic cognition, because it 
would constitute a unifying perspective tying together actual 
brain function and the standard belief-desire framework of 
intentional explanation, as enshrined in the LOT.  
 This abstract computational interpretation of brain 
activity would also need to mesh with the input and output 
capabilities that we want to explain via the attribution of internal 
cognitive structure, e.g. intelligent linguistic performance as in a 
Turing test. So the computational level of description would 
have to conform with observable input and output patterns 
interpreted symbolically, as, say, sentences in an English 
conversation, to yield successful predictions of both new outputs 
given novel inputs, and predictions correctly describing new 
brain configurations entailed by the theory as realizations of the 
appropriate formal transformations required to produce the 
predicted symbolic output.  
 Such a project would have exceedingly non-trivial 
scientific/empirical value, not in the least undermined by 
Putnam-Searle type arguments. Objections of this kind have 
polemical force only against CST, and in light of the many 
empirical constraints and opportunities for testing predictions of 
both external behaviour and internal brain state, the CST would 
be rendered a completely gratuitous consideration. There is no 
single and simple sufficiency condition in this highly complex 
and multifaceted scientific enterprise. Merely implementing the 
LOT does not magically transform the brain into a mind. On this 
more scientifically plausible version of CTM, computation 
supplies the appropriate high level description of the brain for  
prediction and explanation of actual events, as well as an 
indispensible bridge between causally efficacious brain structure 
and high level accounts in terms of content bearing mental states. 
But computation alone does not make a mind. So I would argue 
that we should retain both MTC and SMA, reject CST, and 
embrace a more empirically grounded version of CTM. When 
faced with the triviality challenge that even a bucket of water 
could be interpreted as implementing the LOT, an advocate of 
this latter version of CTM could happily respond "Yes, and so 
what?". 
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